War is an oft-discussed topic in America right now. People discuss how many deaths there have been on each side, and how the objectives are progressing (or how they are not), and various other details that interest the citizens of a nation at war—for everyone has a vested interest while their country is at war. Of course, another hot topic for debate is the justification for the current war in Iraq. Various politicians, journalists, and celebrities have weighed in on the political, social, and moral justifications for the war. But one debate about war has been simmering for a long time and lies at the heart of past and present anti-war movements: can war be justified at all? Justification for war can come from many angles, but one must eventually examine the core issue—that of the justness of killing in war. A lot of debate has gone into who it is permissible to kill: combatants, non-combatants, guilty persons, innocent bystanders; and there have been many arguments on just how to define those groups of people. Most of all, people have long debated by what principles killing for god or country can be justified morally. None of these justifications, however, provide a satisfactory moral case for just killing in war, and as such, they are not sufficient to justify war itself.
I have chosen two articles with differing views on the morality of killing in war (though they both think it is morally permissible, the justifications and lines drawn are distinct). The first is Robert K. Fullinwider's War and Innocence1 and the second is Lawrence A. Alexander's Self-Defense and the Killing of Noncombatants2, which is a direct reply to Fullinwider. First I will examine Fullinwider's somewhat simpler argument before diving into Alexander's response, which is a more complex model based on Fullinwider's original. After that, I will give my own reasons for which killing should be (and can be) avoided in general.
First, we must set up the thought experiment on which Fullinwider, Alexander, and I are working. This stars the ubiquitous Smith and Jones, and the basic example is the following:
Jones is walking down a street. Smith steps from behind the corner of a nearby building and begins to fire a gun at Jones, with the appearance of deliberate intent to kill Jones. Surrounded by buildings, Jones is afforded no means of escape. Jones, who is carrying a gun himself, shoots at Smith and kills him.3
Fullinwider then gives various examples of third-parties motivating Smith to kill Jones, such as mob debts or a spurned spouse, but claims that while the Principle of Self-Defense (whose definition is a point of contention) justifies Jones killing Smith, it does not permit Jones to then turn his gun on those who motivated Smith to start shooting. Thus he begins to set up the distinctions between combatants and non-combatants.
Most people in this world agree with the general Principle of Self-Defense—that is, the right to defend your person against attack. Many, even those espousing the categorical imperative "do not kill," support the right to use killing force if that is what is necessary. Usually the default case is that of Smith and Jones—if the attack on your person is deadly (or proportionate to death), then a response of deadly force is morally justified. For example, if Smith had instead punched Jones (presumably without damaging a vital organ), few would support Jones' killing in response to Smith's threat, for this would be viewed as an extreme reaction to a relatively low threat. I do not pretend that, ceteris paribus (and my own actions if in Jones' position aside), I would condemn Jones for his self-defensive action in the given case. Killing and self-defense in war, however, is much more problematic.
First of all, any and all offensive action cannot be justified by the Principle of Self-Defense. Clearly nowhere in our current model of self-defense (with which Alexander disagrees) is Smith justified if he had succeeded in killing Jones. The obvious response is to conclude that belligerent aggressor nations are never justified in starting a war, but the defending nation is justified in defending itself. This is fair conclusion, but that is not the only consequence. Fullinwider says "a nation may justifiably kill in self-defense." 4 But this is a problem, for nations do not fight each other directly. Instead, people do, and many common military practices, such as patrols, (tactical) pre-emptive strikes, and even beginning to fire before your enemy does are all unjustified by the Principle of Self-Defense. Jones must wait for Smith to open fire before responding in kind.
Let's suppose, then, that a close friend tipped Jones off to Smith's plan. If Jones decides only to carry his firearm that day, or to let Smith come to him, the situation stays the same. But in war, even those defending their country regularly actively seek out their enemy to kill. So let's say that Jones sets out carrying his weapon, thinking to check the areas that Smith frequents so that he may be able to strike first. As it ostensibly often happens in war, Smith and Jones do happen across each other and both begin firing at roughly the same time—a classic 'fire fight.' For the sake of the argument, let's say that both end up killing each other, and upon arriving at the proverbial Pearly Gates, both claim that they only shot in self-defense. This, as we can see, is largely true. Jones knew that Smith was out to kill him, and further knew that fighting would begin on sight. Smith, as soon as Jones took his first shot, was also in a defensive position. But the classic definition of the Principle of Self-Defense seems to hinge on not only the guilt of the aggressor (for even innocent aggressors such as the mentally deranged are guilty of the attack itself) but the at least relative innocence of the defender. And if both parties are equally guilty or innocent, and if both parties can justifiably claim they were defending their persons, the Principle of Self-Defense cannot justify one party killing the other.
Alexander provides a more complex version of the Principle of Self-Defense that goes into more detail. It is reproduced here:
What I propose as the correct formulation of the Principle of Self-Defense is that X (a person or persons) may be killed in self-defense, regardless of X's moral innocence, if the defender perceives (reasonably) that: (1) there exists the requisite threshold level of danger or greater; (2) killing X will reduce that danger; (3) more desirable courses of action, such as killing fewer or guiltier persons, or not killing at all, will not eliminate condition (1); and (4) more desirable courses of action will not reduce the danger as much as killing X.5
Alexander also adds another scenario to the Smith and Jones story. If Smith is being held at gunpoint and told to attack Jones, Jones is now morally allowed to shoot the people holding Smith at gunpoint, and indeed, it would be desirable because it would more fully eliminate the threat. This seems wholly acceptable, but Alexander's self-defense, in part because it does not rely on any relative moral innocence, goes on to justify pre-emptive killing. He says, "One cannot hold the view forbidding intervention before the last choice necessary for the harm as an absolute and at the same time accept the Principle of Self-Defense."6 What Alexander means is that the aggressor can still choose to cease hostilities, and yet many acts commonly justified by the Principle of Self-Defense happen before this final choice is made. He continues, "only the likelihood of harm, not the number of choices required to bring it about, is directly relevant."7
The likelihood of harm, however, can be a tricky thing. Let's say my neighbor, Mr. Z, is building a pipe bomb in his garage. I know that Mr. Z is building this pipe bomb, and that he is angry with me for mowing my lawn on Sundays. Coming to the reasonable conclusion that Mr. Z is likely building the pipe bomb in order to kill me, I decide that there exists the requisite danger to my life, killing Mr. Z will reduce the danger, and just calling the police will not fully eliminate the danger to my life. As such, one morning I throw a grenade through Mr. Z's kitchen window and kill him (certainly a response proportionate to being killed by his pipe bomb). The problem of using the 'likelihood of harm' is the same problem faced by moral arguments of potentiality: for example, I cannot kill my other neighbor, Mrs. Y, based only on the fact that she has the potential to become a serial killer.
The problem with potentiality (in this case) is proving that the potential, or likelihood as Alexander puts it, is high enough to merit concern. For example, if Mrs. Y has been slowly stockpiling weapons, that evidence surely increases the potential for her to do harm. But we must draw the line at some point, and that line has been traditionally drawn at the point of the first aggressive action taken, or sometimes just before, as in a case of intervention (the bomb squad raiding Mr. Z's house, for example, is a case of intervening before harm is done). Intervention, however, to be justified by the Principle of Self-Defense and yet not fall into the trap of distant potentiality, must occur when the stakes are certain. Thus Jones cannot seek out Smith the morning that Jones hasheard Smith will try to kill him, as Jones cannot yet be sure that Smith will indeed carry out the rumored action. Thus, pre-emptive attacks and patrols are still left unjustified by self-defense, though opening fire on sight of an armed enemy instead of waiting for the enemy to fire first can be sufficiently supported by this Principle of Self-Defense.
Other problems crop up with Alexander's revised self-defense. First, since criterion (1) is equivocal, let's say for now the requisite level of danger is the traditional threat to your own life, as in the Smith and Jones example. Clearly if Smith was threatening slander and public humiliation, Jones would not be justified in killing Smith to defend himself against said slander. Conditions (2) and (4) are problematic. If someone is threatening you with any level of harm, no course of action will reduce the threat more than killing the aggressor. Furthermore, condition (2) requires killing to only reduce the danger, which is not equivalent to condition (3) requiring "more desirable" actions to go so far as to "eliminate" the danger. Perhaps killing should be required to eliminate danger and "more desirable" actions, such as not killing, can be given the grace of only reducing said danger.
But even so, condition (4)'s claim that non-lethal options must reduce the threat more than killing could lead to Alexander's Principle of Self-Defense to justify actions he did not intend. For example, if Jones had been carrying both a TASER and a gun, and since using the TASER on Smith would allow Smith to re-initiate the threat later, Jones would not only be justified in choosing the gun, but it would be preferable since it would more fully eliminate the threat on Jones' life. The level of reduction of threat cannot be morally relevant on the same grounds that potentiality is not. For example, if Jones drew his gun and shot Smith in the arm, it is still possible that Smith could return fire, whereas if Jones shot to kill the potential harm is erased. But the potential for future threat is not relevant to the decision of a mode of self-defense. When in a fist-fight that normally would not threaten life, it is impermissible to decide to kill your opponent because s/he may one day attempt to take revenge for the fight.
In fact, in the vast majority of self-defense cases a "more desirable [course] of action, such as killing fewer or guiltier persons, or not killing at all" 8 is available. The most obvious in the Smith and Jones example is that of Jones returning fire without intent to kill, and rather firing with intent to incapacitate by hitting non-vital organs. Depending partly on the weapon being used to attack, the defender has many choices: evasion, attempting to incapacitate (throwing rocks, e.g.), calling for (hopefully also nonviolent) aid, or attempting to verbally defuse the situation (diplomacy). Of course, in war a soldier is often not given most of these options, largely because the situation typically involves more than one person on each side and the threat is extremely high. A standoff situation though, might be verbally defused. Or a general melee could be defused by using non-lethal force (many weapons are in fact in development that use various forms of energy to incapacitate crowds9). Other situations might be defused by superior numbers or superior lethal/non-lethal firepower. Some situations can be defused just by deterrent power, such as the three Taiwan Strait Crises10 in which America's nuclear or conventional power kept the People's Republic of China from invading the Republic of China. The effectiveness of deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, is a debate for another day, but deterrence by threat of retaliation does bear mentioning (even if it is on shaky moral ground). So in response to Alexander's third condition for killing in self-defense, a non-lethal retaliation (or in general a "more desirable course of action") is nearly always available.
So, while killing in self-defense may be in some situations morally permissible, it is always superogatory to refrain from killing. In the domain of self-defense, it would never be uncharitable for the defender to not kill the aggressor. Of course, superogatory actions are by definition not obligatory. But when faced with a choice between a morally permissible neutral action (such as killing in self-defense or refraining from giving a homeless person food) and a morally superogatory action (such as using non-lethal means of self-defense or buying a homeless person a sandwich), it is always more desirable (ceteris paribus) to choose the superogatory action. The superogatory action is by definition morally good and above and beyond moral obligations. Maximizing the number of decisions to take the superogatory action is a worthy goal. I am not claiming that one should simply excuse transgressions. For example, if I decide to call the police on the bomb-building Mr. Z, the choice is between the superogatory action of giving him complete autonomy and the obligatory action of protecting the safety of those around Mr. Z. The choice to call the police instead of killing Mr. Z is the superogatory vs. neutral decision that lies within the obligatory action of protecting people's safety (self-defense). In summary, in the case that I know that Mr. Z is building a bomb, it is obligatory for me to take some action to prevent him from harming himself or others. It is superogatory for me to decide not to kill Mr. Z and instead notify the police, who can safely and without harming Mr. Z remove the threat of the bomb. In many situations similar to the case of Mr. Z, though, it may be said that refraining from killing to stop the threat is obligatory in the face of alternative actions that do not require making an exception to a normally morally impermissible action. Once again, starting a war (being the belligerent or aggressor nation) is soundly impermissible, even when the war is started to stop a threat (since that threat could ostensibly be defused in alternative ways). It is also questionable whether the use of lethal tactics in a defensive war is permissible if and when non-lethal tactics are available.
Conclusion
The Principle of Self-Defense is not sufficient justification for killing during war, and if killing during war is unjustified, war itself (excepting a war without killing, 'twere to exist) must also be unjustified. So, self-defense is not a sufficient reason to permit war. Of course, many have posited other justifications not covered by this paper, for example the Principle of Punishment, as it is called, or a principle of retribution/vengeance. I believe, however, that even if punishment or retribution could justify war, without a sufficient case for just killing in war these theories falter. Perhaps there could be a war without killing (especially as we enter the age of robotic combatants), but so far it has not happened. If punishment and/or retribution can be carried out without killing, though, most people would refer to it as a diplomatic solution and not war.
I have not attempted to claim that the Principle of Self-Defense is faulty or immoral, just that it is insufficient in many (or most) cases to justify killing in self-defense. Also, since once a conflict (war) has started both the defender and the aggressor, when examining individual skirmishes, can claim self-defense. So, both become an aggressor and a defender, and an aggressor is never justified in killing, or at the very least the Principle of Self-Defense cannot apply to an aggressor-aggressor situation. And finally, I posited that it may in fact be obligatory to use non-lethal force (or a non-violent course of action), even while defending oneself, if both lethal and non-lethal options are available. I do not make a pacifist claim of inaction over any violent action, but rather a non-violent claim. That is, a defensive action should be first non-violent. In the case that a non-violent reaction is not enough, non-lethal, preferably as low-harm as possible, violent action can be taken. Finally, in some extreme cases lethal action is permissible, but these extreme cases are almost the exception that proves the rule, in that a non-lethal action is almost always available. If lethal action in self-defense is only permissible in extreme cases, even self-defensive war may only be permissible in extreme cases. Thus, the Principle of Self-Defense is not sufficient justification for war.
Notes
The problem with potentiality (in this case) is proving that the potential, or likelihood as Alexander puts it, is high enough to merit concern. For example, if Mrs. Y has been slowly stockpiling weapons, that evidence surely increases the potential for her to do harm. But we must draw the line at some point, and that line has been traditionally drawn at the point of the first aggressive action taken, or sometimes just before, as in a case of intervention (the bomb squad raiding Mr. Z's house, for example, is a case of intervening before harm is done). Intervention, however, to be justified by the Principle of Self-Defense and yet not fall into the trap of distant potentiality, must occur when the stakes are certain. Thus Jones cannot seek out Smith the morning that Jones hasheard Smith will try to kill him, as Jones cannot yet be sure that Smith will indeed carry out the rumored action. Thus, pre-emptive attacks and patrols are still left unjustified by self-defense, though opening fire on sight of an armed enemy instead of waiting for the enemy to fire first can be sufficiently supported by this Principle of Self-Defense.
Other problems crop up with Alexander's revised self-defense. First, since criterion (1) is equivocal, let's say for now the requisite level of danger is the traditional threat to your own life, as in the Smith and Jones example. Clearly if Smith was threatening slander and public humiliation, Jones would not be justified in killing Smith to defend himself against said slander. Conditions (2) and (4) are problematic. If someone is threatening you with any level of harm, no course of action will reduce the threat more than killing the aggressor. Furthermore, condition (2) requires killing to only reduce the danger, which is not equivalent to condition (3) requiring "more desirable" actions to go so far as to "eliminate" the danger. Perhaps killing should be required to eliminate danger and "more desirable" actions, such as not killing, can be given the grace of only reducing said danger.
But even so, condition (4)'s claim that non-lethal options must reduce the threat more than killing could lead to Alexander's Principle of Self-Defense to justify actions he did not intend. For example, if Jones had been carrying both a TASER and a gun, and since using the TASER on Smith would allow Smith to re-initiate the threat later, Jones would not only be justified in choosing the gun, but it would be preferable since it would more fully eliminate the threat on Jones' life. The level of reduction of threat cannot be morally relevant on the same grounds that potentiality is not. For example, if Jones drew his gun and shot Smith in the arm, it is still possible that Smith could return fire, whereas if Jones shot to kill the potential harm is erased. But the potential for future threat is not relevant to the decision of a mode of self-defense. When in a fist-fight that normally would not threaten life, it is impermissible to decide to kill your opponent because s/he may one day attempt to take revenge for the fight.
In fact, in the vast majority of self-defense cases a "more desirable [course] of action, such as killing fewer or guiltier persons, or not killing at all" 8 is available. The most obvious in the Smith and Jones example is that of Jones returning fire without intent to kill, and rather firing with intent to incapacitate by hitting non-vital organs. Depending partly on the weapon being used to attack, the defender has many choices: evasion, attempting to incapacitate (throwing rocks, e.g.), calling for (hopefully also nonviolent) aid, or attempting to verbally defuse the situation (diplomacy). Of course, in war a soldier is often not given most of these options, largely because the situation typically involves more than one person on each side and the threat is extremely high. A standoff situation though, might be verbally defused. Or a general melee could be defused by using non-lethal force (many weapons are in fact in development that use various forms of energy to incapacitate crowds9). Other situations might be defused by superior numbers or superior lethal/non-lethal firepower. Some situations can be defused just by deterrent power, such as the three Taiwan Strait Crises10 in which America's nuclear or conventional power kept the People's Republic of China from invading the Republic of China. The effectiveness of deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, is a debate for another day, but deterrence by threat of retaliation does bear mentioning (even if it is on shaky moral ground). So in response to Alexander's third condition for killing in self-defense, a non-lethal retaliation (or in general a "more desirable course of action") is nearly always available.
So, while killing in self-defense may be in some situations morally permissible, it is always superogatory to refrain from killing. In the domain of self-defense, it would never be uncharitable for the defender to not kill the aggressor. Of course, superogatory actions are by definition not obligatory. But when faced with a choice between a morally permissible neutral action (such as killing in self-defense or refraining from giving a homeless person food) and a morally superogatory action (such as using non-lethal means of self-defense or buying a homeless person a sandwich), it is always more desirable (ceteris paribus) to choose the superogatory action. The superogatory action is by definition morally good and above and beyond moral obligations. Maximizing the number of decisions to take the superogatory action is a worthy goal. I am not claiming that one should simply excuse transgressions. For example, if I decide to call the police on the bomb-building Mr. Z, the choice is between the superogatory action of giving him complete autonomy and the obligatory action of protecting the safety of those around Mr. Z. The choice to call the police instead of killing Mr. Z is the superogatory vs. neutral decision that lies within the obligatory action of protecting people's safety (self-defense). In summary, in the case that I know that Mr. Z is building a bomb, it is obligatory for me to take some action to prevent him from harming himself or others. It is superogatory for me to decide not to kill Mr. Z and instead notify the police, who can safely and without harming Mr. Z remove the threat of the bomb. In many situations similar to the case of Mr. Z, though, it may be said that refraining from killing to stop the threat is obligatory in the face of alternative actions that do not require making an exception to a normally morally impermissible action. Once again, starting a war (being the belligerent or aggressor nation) is soundly impermissible, even when the war is started to stop a threat (since that threat could ostensibly be defused in alternative ways). It is also questionable whether the use of lethal tactics in a defensive war is permissible if and when non-lethal tactics are available.
Conclusion
The Principle of Self-Defense is not sufficient justification for killing during war, and if killing during war is unjustified, war itself (excepting a war without killing, 'twere to exist) must also be unjustified. So, self-defense is not a sufficient reason to permit war. Of course, many have posited other justifications not covered by this paper, for example the Principle of Punishment, as it is called, or a principle of retribution/vengeance. I believe, however, that even if punishment or retribution could justify war, without a sufficient case for just killing in war these theories falter. Perhaps there could be a war without killing (especially as we enter the age of robotic combatants), but so far it has not happened. If punishment and/or retribution can be carried out without killing, though, most people would refer to it as a diplomatic solution and not war.
I have not attempted to claim that the Principle of Self-Defense is faulty or immoral, just that it is insufficient in many (or most) cases to justify killing in self-defense. Also, since once a conflict (war) has started both the defender and the aggressor, when examining individual skirmishes, can claim self-defense. So, both become an aggressor and a defender, and an aggressor is never justified in killing, or at the very least the Principle of Self-Defense cannot apply to an aggressor-aggressor situation. And finally, I posited that it may in fact be obligatory to use non-lethal force (or a non-violent course of action), even while defending oneself, if both lethal and non-lethal options are available. I do not make a pacifist claim of inaction over any violent action, but rather a non-violent claim. That is, a defensive action should be first non-violent. In the case that a non-violent reaction is not enough, non-lethal, preferably as low-harm as possible, violent action can be taken. Finally, in some extreme cases lethal action is permissible, but these extreme cases are almost the exception that proves the rule, in that a non-lethal action is almost always available. If lethal action in self-defense is only permissible in extreme cases, even self-defensive war may only be permissible in extreme cases. Thus, the Principle of Self-Defense is not sufficient justification for war.
Notes
- Fullinwider, Robert K. “War and Innocence.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1975):90-97.
- Alexander, Lawrence A. “Self-Defense and the Killing of Noncombatants: A Reply to Fullinwider.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no. 4 (Summer 1976):408-15.
- Fullinwider, “War,” 90-91.
- Ibid. 94
- Alexander, “Self-Defense,” 409.
- Ibid. 410
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-lethal_weapons for general information and some links to and descriptions of weapons that exist or are under development. E.g.: pepper spray, electroshock weapons, the Active Denial System, acoustic/sonic weapons, sticky foam, non-lethal rounds, et cetera.
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis
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